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ABSTRACT

The Influence of Threatened State Preemption on City Council
Voting Behavior and Municipal Broadband
by
Dillon P. Corbridge, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2017
Major Professor: Dr. Damon Cann
Department: Political Science
Since the progressive era, American cities have generally expanded their
authority in policymaking and service provision. State governments have at times
acted to preempt city authority on particular points of policy, but it is unclear
whether the threat of this action inspires caution in the decision making of city
leaders. The results of an experimental survey distributed to elected city officials
across the United States show that a perceived threat of preemption does not
significantly discourage city leaders in supporting a proposed broadband internet
service provision. These results suggest that political pressure in the form of
preemption is not persuasive to city leaders, and that local representational
interests are likely more influential on municipal government.
(62 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT
The Influence of Threatened State Preemption on City Council
Voting Behavior and Municipal Broadband
Dillon P. Corbridge
The relationship between city and state government has been contentious
at times throughout American history. Cities only have the legal authority granted
to them by state government, yet many cities have cause to seek policy that may
not be in the interest of those who govern the state. Leaders of American states
may choose to preempt municipal authority by removing the legal power of a city
to perform certain actions. While preemption provides states with a tool for
regulating the policies and practices that cities may pursue, it is unclear whether
city leaders act cautiously to avoid preemption, or instead only pursue different
policy goals once preemption removes more preferred options. This thesis
examines this question through an experimental research design where, under
varying degrees of threatened preemption, elected municipal officials were asked
about their potential support for a new broadband internet service provision. The
results of this research suggest that perceived threats of preemption do not have a
significant effect on the policy choices of city leaders, and that preemption
remains a blunt instrument for states in directing municipal policy outcomes.
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Introduction—City/State Conflict and Local Decision-making
In the United States, the power dynamics of a federalist system have been
well studied and scrutinized. The conflicts between state and national government
have animated political debate for centuries and has helped to guide some of the
rhetoric that surrounds discussion of the United States Civil War to this day. Less
understood, however, is the more local sort of federalist conflict and tension that
exists in the United States between states and their constituent cities. This conflict
was especially apparent in North Carolina in the months following the passing of
House Bill 2 in March of 2016. The bill gained notoriety for its requirement that
people using bathrooms in state facilities must use the bathroom that corresponds
with the sex listed on their birth certificates. However, the political origins and
wider reach of this bill received less attention. In addition to its regulation of state
restroom facilities, House Bill 2 superseded and preempted “any ordinance,
regulation, resolution, or policy adopted or imposed by a unit of local government”
relating to wages, hours, or benefits, and prevented the filing of discrimination
lawsuits in state court (House Bill 2 2016).
With the passage of this bill, the state of North Carolina effectively stripped
city governments within the state of the ability to pass particular forms of antidiscrimination legislation, as well as minimum wage provisions. For the city of
Charlotte, these restrictions had direct policy and legal consequences, as the city
had itself voted to add gay and transgender people to the list of classes protected

against discrimination in public spaces (Delia 2016). The following controversy
would bring significant national attention as well as negative economic
consequences.
While these details have been well-reported throughout North Carolina and
the rest of the United States, a question remains—If city leaders in Charlotte could
see the future and know that the state would nullify their actions, would they still
pass the same legislation and set off a chain of events that would invite national
scrutiny, legal battles, and boycotts? Generally, does the threat of state action alter
the decisions that city leaders are likely to make, or do the local electoral
incentives in front of city leaders override concerns about state intervention? It
may be that some of these conflicts are driven by ideology, emotion, and outside
interests, as appears to have been the case in North Carolina. The fundamental
conflict between the policy interests of cities and states, along with the decisionmaking process for city leaders that accompanies such conflict, remain important,
and under-researched. This thesis addresses this sort of conflict by directly posing
a potential service proposal to city officers and gauging their voting responses
while under varying degrees of threat of state intervention and preemption, and
finds that voting behavior of city leaders is resistant to such threats.

City-Provided Internet Access as a Question Mechanism
The nature of political ideology and competing voter interests can make
this question difficult to examine directly, as omitted ideological and voter
variables can present great difficulties for research. It is entirely possible that if a
study about state preemption and municipal voting behaviors asked questions
about the wrong subject—such as the rights of transgender people and
bathrooms—the researcher would merely find out how respondents felt about
LGBT issues, rather than if a threat of state preemption had an effect on the
municipal leader’s vote. In order to more directly gauge the impact of threatened
preemption on municipal voting, I have asked city leaders about their potential
votes on a proposal for municipally provided broadband service. Although any
service proposal or expenditure involves ideological conflict, a service proposal will
be less emotional and less politically explosive than certain other forms of
controversial legislation, and city leaders will likely be more open to both
persuasion and a variety of local pressures. Rather than being a local manifestation
of a hotly contested national issue, a service proposal is a local manifestation of
local issues. Here New York’s Mayor LaGuardia’s famous statement that, "There is
no Republican or Democratic way to pick up the garbage" provides insight
(Andersson and Moroni 2014, 93). Internet access does not hold the importance of
waste disposal, but it is potential service where the details of local politics can
cross political lines, and be shaped by budgetary, legal, and electoral incentives.

The subject of municipal broadband provides an interesting framework for
examining city responsiveness in the United States, as well as preemption, home
rule, and public goods provision. As high-speed internet access has become
increasingly ubiquitous, reliance on this service has increased as well. Access to
broadband internet is becoming increasingly important to households throughout
the United States, but that access has come in different forms in different places,
and this service has not always been extended to all areas equally. According to a
2015 White House report, there still exists a connectivity gap in many
communities, where some are able to obtain high-quality internet access and
others are not. In other communities, a single telecommunications company may
dominate a market, facing little, if any competition (Executive Office of the
President, 2015, 10). Although public service commissions have regulatory power
over these issues, a city’s preferences may not fully align with the commission’s
actions or the state of the market. In this environment, some municipalities have
elected to establish a network themselves and act as an internet service provider
(ISP) within their jurisdiction,, either competing with or supplanting local
monopolies. Theories of electoral politics may lead us to believe that this decision
is an active response to the desires of the local voting public in these communities,
but such decisions have at times been controversial at the state level, with 21 states
having established some type of restriction on this form of municipal activity. At
this time, there are about 160 municipalities in the United States that offer some

form of broadband service to the majority of their residents, while another 185
communities maintain some publicly-owned fiber service available to potions of
the community (Institute for Local Self-Reliance 2015).
The subject of municipal broadband represents an ongoing arena for
conflict between cities and states, where cities may choose to establish new
services, and states may wish to curtail such actions. It also represents a good
potential test subject for city and state conflict, as it avoids the explosive and
problematic conflicts that some other policy arenas face. While there will be
conflict on this issue, it is reasonable to suppose that a competition of influences
may alter the considered voting decisions of some city council members.
To examine this competition of influences, I used an experimental survey,
sampling city leaders throughout the United States. The treatments within the
experiment relied on descriptive vignettes, which provided city leaders with a
hypothetical new service proposal, and asked whether they supported or opposed
the proposition. Preemption targeted towards flawed or unpopular policy would
simply give city leaders one extra reason among many to oppose a proposal. Thus,
in order to isolate whether a threat of state preemption reduces the likelihood of
affirming votes, the proposal described in these vignettes for this project was
intentionally designed to be benign, if not appealing. The results of this project
demonstrate that in the case of a perceived threat of preemption, city leaders are
resistant to coercive influence from state legislatures.

Literature on City Responsiveness and Public Service Provision
This project is rooted in the broader political science literature on the
responsiveness of elected officials and municipal politics. There are strong
theoretical arguments and reasonable evidence to support the claim that cities are
responsive to the political and economic sentiments of their residents, and that
city policy and spending reflect these sentiments. The broader context of public
services research provides a backdrop for this issue, by illustrating the processes of
why and how local governments are responsive to their residents. Charles Tiebout,
who proposed a “pure theory of public expenditures”, wrote the most important
theoretical work regarding municipal services (Tiebout 1956). In Tiebout’s
theoretical model, citizens will sort themselves according to their service
preferences, by moving to areas that most closely allocate the balance of taxes and
provided services to the residents’ individual predilections. Tiebout’s work is a
pure theory rather than an applied model. Thus it describes an equilibrium state;
with citizens choosing from a large number of communities and enjoying full
mobility, knowledge, and no employment restrictions, they will perfectly sort
themselves along preferences of relative service provision and tax burdens. This
phenomenon of individuals and households voting with their feet, termed as “exit”
by Albert O. Hirschman (1970), is the primary lens through which Tiebout’s theory
has been examined (Dowding, John, and Biggs 1994). Hirschman’s work also gives
attention to the process by which internal protest, referred to as “voice,” may also

come to influence firms, organizations and states. Both of these processes are
critical for how municipalities come to reflect the will of their constituents over
time or consequently shrink, and will be further examined.
Tiebout and Hirschman’s work are seminal to the literature on both local
public expenditures and responsiveness, and many applied models have been
created to test the basic premise of Tiebout’s theory that citizens vote with their
feet. Dowding, John, and Biggs (1994, 768) provide a helpful survey of much of the
empirical literature on the subject, stating that empirical tests of Tiebout’s work
“are legion and multifarious.” Because that work is varied and at times
contradictory, I will give a brief overview of some of the most commonly cited
work in this area.
Bickers, Salucci, and Stein (2006) find that residents’ feelings regarding
“core municipal services” are among the strongest determinants of whether people
will move. Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) find that positive changes in the local levels
of air pollution, which they describe as exogenous improvements in public goods,
will result in increased population density. Stated more directly, people will vote
with their feet and move to better access better public goods such as clean air, just
as Tiebout predicts. The prevalence of this action is likely increasing over time, as
the cost of moving has decreased significantly over the past century. Rhode and
Strumpf (2003) find that the impact of the exit phenomenon has become more
pronounced over the past 150 years due to lowered moving costs, but they also

argue that publicly provided goods demands are not necessarily obvious or the
first priority for movers. Devereux and Weisbrod (2006) also find that dissatisfied
residents are more likely to either move or complain, and that these alternatives
will result in political response. From a normative perspective, it seems both
intuitive and positive that communities will eventually mold their constituents.
The empirical evidence for these claims shows that electoral incentives are at work
in cities, and these incentives may at times run counter to the ideological values of
certain representatives.
While there is much support for Tiebout’s theory in the literature, there is
also significant criticism. Boadway and Tremblay (2012) find that while it may still
have relevance in the most local of issues, it is not helpful in studying state-level
fiscal policy. Truman Bewley (1981) argues that Tiebout’s model is suited to narrow
cases and is thus not satisfying as a general theory of local public goods. In certain
applications, restrictions based on the housing market may also be shown to be
more important to citizen choice than public services. In this instance, exit alone
does not provide a compelling story for why municipal institutions offer particular
services (Kelleher and Lowery 2002).
The structure of the community may matter as well. Lowery (2000) argues
that the process of consolidating municipalities into a larger whole may be
beneficial to both local interests and the offering of higher quality public services.
The research of Lyons, Lowery, and DeHoog (1992, 15-16) finds further evidence of

this. The implications of citizen sorting as an aspect of the Tiebout model become
less clear, however, in a consolidated government setting, and thus it is difficult to
come to full conclusions about the virtue of consolidated government in public
service provision (Lyons, Lowery and Dehoog 1992). Schneider (1986) argues that
fragmented municipal governments are inherently associated with a degree of
competition that will result in smaller budgets. Rather than focusing on public
services, Schneider (1989) in a later article focuses on the local tax levels and
argues that local government may vie for citizen attention by exacting a lower tax
burden on their residents.
In addition to these concerns, cities may be quite limited in their capability
to pursue these issues, due to limited statutory authority, limited capacity, and
limited finances. Statutory authority is of particular interest here. State
preemption of city authority is a current and often controversial issue, as already
discussed with reference to North Carolina and the city of Charlotte. Preemption
has received a great deal of attention from law reviews, but academic treatments
are much less common. Instead, academic literature more frequently focuses on
the general principle of home rule. In general terms, cities possess the power that
they are given by the state legislature. However, this is not a simple, conclusive, or
carved-in-stone rule. Municipal independence, or home rule, is a legal principle
that exists to varying degrees throughout the United States. Because of this, cities
in many states have differing degrees of independence and statutory authority.

Although most states have some degree of home rule, it is typically in the form of
structural or functional home rule, rather than a broader, sweeping sort of rule
that necessarily includes all functions and fiscal powers (Krane, Rigos, and Hill
2001, 1-4, 476-477). While cities are often limited in their statutory power, this
limitation does not provide a clear obstacle to the establishment of municipal
communication networks, as many of these networks exist in states with very
limited municipal independence. 1
City leaders are generally responsive to the political desires of their
constituents (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014). This responsiveness aligns with
partisan electoral outcomes as well (Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw 2016;
Einstein and Kogan 2015). This responsiveness may be resistant to outside
influences, making it difficult for any non-constituent group to influence local
outcomes. Preemption may also introduce dynamics that alter political
responsiveness in elected officials at the municipal level. Certain issues and
positions may be positively viewed by particular communities, but failure to enact
or create such policy or goods may also fail to inspire any sort of impassioned
response, either in terms of votes or in terms of decisions to move. Although there
may be positive consequences for pursuing some policies, it does not necessarily

1

These networks exist in Dillon’s Rule states such as Alabama, New Hampshire, Virginia, and Iowa.
In these states city authority is limited solely to the powers granted by the legislature. It appears
that the establishment of a communication network is an assumed power related to the provision
of basic services, as this power is not explicitly granted in obvious terms (Institute for Local SelfReliance 2015; Krane, Rigos, and Hill 2001, 4, 476-477).

follow in all circumstances that a failure to pursue such policy will have negative
repercussions of significance for elected officials. Preemption could limit how
responsive municipal leaders may be to their residents, and enforce policy
homogeneity in various cities across a state. In pursuing their own reelections and
their resident’s desired policy outcomes, city leaders may want to avoid a situation
that leads to preemption even if that decision comes at the cost of pursuing
responsive policy, unless they believe that resisting outside influence will be more
appreciated than saving resources will be.
Home internet access as a public service should also be addressed.
Although rural access has improved dramatically, the disparity between urban and
rural internet users persists (US Department of Commerce 2016). Although the
merits of the argument for publicly owned broadband may need to be tested, and
are beyond the scope of this project, this issue has received some scholarly
attention. Jain, Mandviwalla, and Banker (2007) argue that private
telecommunication firms have in the past generally underserved rural and
impoverished areas, and suggest that municipal government may act as a catalyst
for technological development within its geographic area. Gillett, Lehr, and Osorio
(2004) give a detailed taxonomy of local government broadband initiatives,
discussing the varying roles of municipalities in broadband provision. Their
findings fit the assumption that municipalities may be filling gaps left by private
market providers, and they present evidence that municipal electric utilities are

more likely to provide communication infrastructure when private-market cable
and DSL options are limited.2 This assertion also fits the assumption that public
internet services would be desired by the residents of the community in these
communities, as there would be fewer useful private-market alternatives.

2

These assumptions of broadband access are based on the FCC’s January 2015 revision of the
definition of broadband to minimum download and upload speeds of 25 Mbps and 3 Mbps
respectively. Under prior definitions of broadband access, rural communities have better access to
broadband, though it is still generally weak compared to what is available in urban and suburban
centers.

Incentives and Inhibitions for New Public Services
As noted above, there is a large body of scholarly literature that argues that
cities are politically responsive to their residents and that public opinion and
elections have a meaningful impact on policy and spending in municipal
government (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014; Einstein and Kogan 2015;
Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw 2016). However, mitigating factors to this
phenomenon are less well researched. This raises the question of what scenarios
may lead city leaders to abandon proposals that they would otherwise pursue in
order to satisfy local voters and ensure city growth. While certain practical
concerns such as budgetary problems or limited technical capacity provide simple
and intuitive explanations for why some proposals may be abandoned, these
explanations are often unique to a particular situation or location, and do not
provide a consistent political reason for cities to avoid popular policy. In contrast,
the threat of preemption from the state government may inspire city leaders to
abandon potential policy pursuits, as preemption may make such pursuits a waste
of time and money, with new projects potentially being either crippled financially
or prohibited altogether. Furthermore, preemption limits the policy outcomes that
might align with voter preferences. The relationship dynamics at play in this form
of intrastate federalism are worthy of consideration.

As of 2014, 21 states had passed legislation that restricts or regulates
municipal offerings of communication services to varying degrees. Legislation in
some states, including Colorado, South Carolina, and Texas, effectively prohibits
municipal broadband offerings. Other states, such as Minnesota, Tennessee, and
Washington, allow the creation of municipal networks under certain local
conditions. This legislation often comes with meaningful restrictions, often
relating to city size, the presence of private offerings, and the nature of local utility
districts (Baller 2014).
The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) has proposed model
legislation that addresses this issue. Portions of this legislation prohibit
municipalities from creating publicly held communications services, such as ISPs
(American Legislative Exchange Council 2012). Garrett and Jansa (2015) provide an
interesting argument that interest group model legislation such as this is an
important component of policy diffusion from state to state, and that such
legislation has an important impact on the substance of legislation and the relative
ease of passing that legislation.3 The piece of model legislation cited here is framed
as providing protection for private industry from unfair public competition.
According to a January 2015 White House report, however, in most communities

3

The article from Garrett and Jansa actually uses model legislation from ALEC as a significant part
of its methodology.

there is little competition in the marketplace for wired internet to begin with. 4 If
there truly is a dearth of competition, it may not be entirely accurate to term the
creation of a new offering as a threat to the integrity of the marketplace, and it is
plausible that city leaders will act to create a public ISP in response to local
demands and political desires. However, any number of local or legal pressures
could operate to diminish the level of responsiveness to this particular problem.
The literature around public responsiveness indicates that cities will be responsive
to local pressures. However, it is also clear in the literature that this responsiveness
is not necessarily straightforward or consistent, and local preferences may vary
significantly from community to community as well.
While the model legislation offered by ALEC may represent a noteworthy
example of interest group lobbying, there is significant variety in how cities and
states may approach the topic of municipal broadband, and the issue does not
seem to be settled at this point in time. As such, municipal broadband programs
and associated state legislation provide a useful test case to examine whether city
leaders may become less responsive to local political interests following a threat of
preemption. It is plausible to assert both that a community might desire this
service, and that a state might preempt city authority on the issue. There are

4

It is important to make a note here about wireless access. Most home wireless access is based on
wired access to the home, with a local point of access. Smartphone internet access is also
noteworthy and increasingly important, but smartphone access outside of WiFi is typically
associated with significant restrictions on monthly bandwidth that make home access a more
feasible economic choice for many (The Executive Office of the President 2015).

practical and ideological concerns that frame these actions, but those concerns do
not inspire the kind of backlash that more often accompany issues like fracking or
LBGT protections. Although the issue of municipal broadband will not be relevant
in every city, town, and village, municipal broadband is an issue that is reasonably
easy to explain and understand in the context of a survey, allowing this question to
be tested.

Testing the Impact of Threat
The chief theoretical assumption driving this project is that variation in the
responses between test groups should reveal whether a threat of preemption on
the state level would change the likely voting patterns of city leaders from a
previous course. Assuming a random sample, the response from the control group
should be representative of the response that each of the treatment groups would
have had without exposure to the succeeding scenarios, allowing simple statistical
tests to provide insight into whether the plans of city leaders are adversely affected
by state behavior in this instance.
To examine the dynamics discussed here and to test whether a given threat
of state intervention affects the decision making of local officials, I have used a
survey experiment, sampling city officials from across the United States.
Invitations to the survey were sent by email to any municipal official that
participated in the 2014 American Municipal Official Survey, so long as those email
addresses did not return as invalid. 5 Email invitations were sent on Tuesday,
February 28, 2017, and the survey closed on Tuesday, March 7, 2017. Respondents
came from 49 of the 50 states, with responses occurring at largely similar rates to

5

Access to the mailing list came through the generosity of principal investigators Daniel Butler and
Adam Dynes. Information about the survey, as well as its results may be found at
http://campuspress.yale.edu/municipalsurvey/.

survey invitations. Further details on responses and geography may be found at
the end of the appendix.
The treatment was presented through a vignette, which asks the respondent
to consider themselves serving in the role of a voting city council member. 6 The
vignettes gave three variations of stated preemption threat, ranging from no stated
threat, to low and high degrees of perceived threat. In both the control and two
treatment groups, the vignette states that the city is considering establishing an
ISP as a new municipal service through the city’s utility department, and describes
the proposal in positive terms, with moderate majority support from local voters.
It also states that the proposal is without any obviously troubling flaws in its
feasibility, both financially and technically. After being presented with one of the
three scenarios, respondents were asked for how they would vote in the given
situation on a four-point scale, with no available neutral response. Respondents in
the treatment groups that indicated support for the proposal were also asked
whether they would choose to act quickly before the state legislature may have the
opportunity to finish action. In addition to the treatment questions, respondents
also answered questions about their political ideology on a single-dimensional leftright scale, and about their representation style as either a delegate or trustee. The

6

Some respondents, such as certain mayors, may be elected officials that lack a voting role on a city
council, while holding a different influential role in the legislative process for a city. The vignette
asks respondents to consider themselves as voting members of the council in order to ensure that
respondents view the questions in the same way.

full text for the survey, including the wording of the vignettes, can be found in the
appendix.
A threat of state preemption is one circumstance that would likely alter the
level of political responsiveness displayed by city officials, because preemption
may alter the incentives of pursuing particular policies and reduce the costs of
failing to pursue those policies as well. This decision process may also make sense
for the state. Although the state is clearly superior in law and capacity, conflicts
between cities and states are not new, and it is reasonable to believe that state
leaders, including the legislature and the governor, would prefer to have cities
within the state acting according to the governor’s and legislator’s personal
preference sets. States may be limited in how they can coerce cities to conform to
preferred policy and institutional positions, and coercion through legislation, or
even through the mere threat of legislation, could act to influence and manipulate
cities into avoiding actions that officials at the state level would rather avoid.
There has been significant variation in the success of these public
broadband programs, along with some noteworthy failures. Invoking concerns of
failure in the vignettes, however, would not serve to answer the central question
about city-state interactions. This project aims to find whether the perceived
threat of state intervention discourages policy that a city is likely to pursue. If the
vignette described a clearly flawed proposal, a threat of state intervention would

be only one of the reasons to vote against the proposal, rather than a determining
reason for a dissenting vote.

Expectations and Hypotheses
While it may be in the best interests of a municipality to pursue a given
policy in a vacuum, the consequences of both preemption from the state or of
challenging such preemption may be too great to be ignored, especially when the
probability of reversing the state action is low. These factors, along with the
previously discussed dynamics around preemption, lead to the following
hypotheses on the relationship between state preemption and political
responsiveness at the municipal level.
Hypothesis 1: A perceived threat of state preemption will decrease the
likelihood of city officials voting for the proposed service.
Hypothesis 2: An increased degree of perceived threat of state preemption will
result in a greater degree of opposition to the proposed service.
It is possible that a threat of preemption will not have a noteworthy impact
on the behavior of city leaders. After all, the residents of a community, not state
legislators, elect city leaders. If city residents were aware of threatened or executed
preemption action from the state, they would likely direct their political
frustrations toward the state, rather than toward their city and its leaders.
Furthermore, hostile actions from a locally unpopular state legislature may provide
city leaders with opportunities to cast themselves as better, more in-touch
representatives of their constituents. If city leaders feel that their actions will have

the support of their constituents in opposition to state-level government, it would
be in their electoral interests to dig in their heels on municipal goals, rather than
simply acceding to the aims of a hostile state legislature. City leaders may attempt
to call the bluff of the state government, as it is not uncommon for legislators to
introduce bills and proposals that are doomed from conception. Furthermore, city
leaders, who are themselves involved the legislative process, may very well realize
when proposed preemption is an empty, rather than sincere threat. If city leaders
perceive that they will not waste valuable city resources by pursuing actions that
are unpopular with the state legislature, the likelihood that a threat of preemption
would alter their behavior would decrease significantly, and the treatments used
here would not have a significant effect.

Results
Respondents were contacted by email, and from the contacted population,
690 responses were recorded. The mailing list from the American Municipal
Official Survey is now a few years old, and as a result, not every individual on the
list is still currently serving in office. I also knew that the list contained a small
number of non-elected municipal officials, including city clerks, managers, and
other appointed officers. To account for the diversity of respondents in the mailing
list, I asked a screening question at the beginning of the survey to determine
whether respondents were currently serving elected officials, former elected
officials, or if they had only served in non-elected positions.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Control and Treatment Groups
Current Elected Officials Only

Current and Former Elected
Officials

Control Group

199

215

Treatment
1—Moderate
Threat

186

199

Treatment
2—High
Threat

184

201

Total

569

615

In each table, values in cells refer to the frequency of each response.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Ideology and Representation Style
Current Elected Officials Only

Current and Former Elected
Officials

Liberal

176
31.32%

193
31.85%

Middle of the
Road

128
22.78%

134
22.11%

Conservative

258
45.9%

279
46.04%

Total

562

606

Delegate

178
32%

193
32.11%

Trustee

379
68%

408
67.89%

Total

557

601

Note: Some respondents completed the treatments questions but declined to answer the
ideology and/or representation style questions. Data indicates frequencies and column
percentages.

Of the sampled population, 569 respondents indicated that they were
currently serving in elected office, while 46 respondents indicated that they have
formerly served as elected officials. Finally, 75 respondents indicated that they
have never served in elected office, but instead hold non-elected positions in their
communities. Because they represent a uniquely different population within the
sample, the responses of those who have never held public office have been
omitted from the results presented here. Additionally, I present the results of
currently serving officials and the combined group of officials that have ever

served in elected office separately, as there are differences in the day to day
experiences of the two groups which might affect their responses. Tables 1 and 2
detail the basic results of the survey.
Chi-square tests show that the treatment effect has far from a statistically
significant impact, whether examining current officials only, or examining both
Table 3: Chi-Square Test for General Support of the Proposal

Current
Elected
Officials
Only

Current and
Former
Elected
Officials

Level of
Support
Strongly
Support

Control

High Threat

Total

95
47.74%

Moderate
Threat
83
44.62%

82
44.57%

260
45.69%

Moderately
Support

72
36.18%

70
37.63%

62
33.7%

204
35.85%

Moderately
Oppose

13
6.53%

21
11.29%

23
12.5%

57
10.02%

Strongly
Oppose

19
9.55%

12
6.45%

17
9.24%

48
8.44%

Total
Strongly
Support

199
104
48.37%

186
87
43.72%

184
87
43.28%

569
278
45.2%

Moderately
Support

76
35.35%

76
38.19%

70
34.83%

222
36.1%

Moderately
Oppose

14
6.51%

22
11.06%

25
12.44%

61
9.92%

Strongly
Oppose

21
9.77%

14
7.04%

19
9.45%

54
8.78%

Total

215

199

201

615

For currently serving officials, χ2= 5.8352, p = 0.442. For Current and former elected officials,
χ2= 6.1972, p= 0.401.

current and former elected officials. The chi-square test shown here applies to a
crosstab table and evaluates whether attitudes toward the municipal broadband
proposal are independent of group assignment. The effect was even weaker when
checking for whether respondents simply supported or opposed the measure, and
when checking solely for respondents that indicated strong support for the
proposal.

Table 4: Chi-Square Test for Broad Support of the Proposal

Current
Elected
Officials
Only

Current
and
Former
Elected
Officials

Voting
Response to
Proposal
Support

Control

Moderate
Threat

High Threat

Total

167
83.92%

153
82.26%

144
78.26%

464
81.55%

Oppose

32
16.08%

33
17.74%

40
21.74%

105
18.45%

Total

199

186

184

569

Support

180
83.72%

163
81.91%

157
78.11%

500
81.3%

Oppose

35
16.28%

36
18.09%

44
21.89%

115
18.7%

Total

215

199

201

615

For currently serving officials, χ2= 2.2.1273, p = 0.345. For Current and former elected
officials, χ2= 2.2234, p= 0.264.

Table 5: Chi-Square Test for Strong Support of the Proposal
Voting
Response
to Proposal
Current
Elected
Officials Only

Control

Moderate
Threat

High Threat

Total

95
47.74%

83
44.62%

82
44.57%

260
45.69%

104
52.26%

103
55.38%

102
55.43%

309
54.31%

199

186

184

569

Total
Strongly
support

104
48.37%

87
43.72%

87
43.28%

278
45.2%

Other
Responses

111
51.63%

112
56.28%

114
56.72%

337
54.8%

Total

215

199

201

615

Strong
Support
Other
Responses

Current and
Former
Elected
Officials

For currently serving officials, χ2= 0.5156, p = 0.773. For Current and former elected officials,
χ2= 1.3477, p= 0.510.

The difference of proportions test is a parametric test for two categories
that has greater statistical power than the chi-square test. The difference of
proportions tests shown here also demonstrate that the treatment did not generate
a statistically significant effect on responses to the municipal broadband proposal,
even when using a generous one-tailed test. The lack of a significant relationship
between the treatment assignment and the respondent’s attitude toward
municipal broadband is consistent when examining either the responses of only
currently serving elected officials, or both current and former elected officials.

Table 6: Difference of Proportions Test for Support of the Proposal
Current Elected Officials Only
Diff.
Std. Err.
p
n
p1 – p 2
Control
vs.
Moderate
Threat
Control
vs. High
Threat
Moderate
Threat vs.
High
Threat

Current and Former Elected Officials
Diff.
Std. Err.
p
n
p1 – p 2

0.017

0.038

0.331

385

0.018

0.037

0.313

414

0.057

0.040

0.078

383

0.056

0.039

0.072

416

0.040

0.041

0.167

370

0.380

0.040

0.171

400

Diff. is the difference of proportions, with standard errors beside it. p represents the one-tailed
p value. The one-tailed test increases the chance of finding a significant relationship between
the treatment and responses, but such a relationship is still found to not be significant.

However, the figures produced by this test are certainly more compelling than the
figures produced by the chi-square model are.
Finally, both ordered and binary probit regression models run on both
sample groups show that the treatment in this experiment did not lead to a
statistically significant change in the likelihood that municipal leaders would vote
in favor of the given proposal. These tests are a full modeling approach that allow
for paired comparisons of different treatments as an omnibus test of the effects of
the test treatments against the control condition. The ordered probit model
examines all available information by incorporating all four available responses

Table 7: Ordered Probit Test for Support of the Proposal
Current Elected Officials
Only
.0364208
.1143098

Current and Former Elected
Officials
.0650715
.1102291

High Threat

.099558
.1145203

.1281586
.1098163

Pseudo-R2

0.0006

0.0009

Moderate Threat

Likelihood Ratio χ2

0.77
1.36
.680
.506
n= 569 for current elected officials only and 615 for current and former elected
officials. Standard Errors in italics.
P

Table 8: Probit Test for Support of the Proposal
Current Elected Officials
Only
-.0659142
.1516067

Current and Former Elected
Officials
-.0711295
.1456557

High Threat

-.210125
.1485672

-.2071578
.1422243

Constant

.9911588
.1066763

.9830529
.102318

Pseudo-R2

0.0006

0.0009

Moderate Threat

Likelihood Ratio χ2

2.10
2.20
.350
.333
n= 569 for current elected officials only and 615 for current and former elected
officials. Standard Errors in italics.
P

regarding the broadband proposal, while the probit model instead evaluates
differences between support and opposition as a binary variable.
It may be possible that the non-significant results found here might be a
result of an insufficient sample size. A power analysis for a difference of
proportions test shows that if the sample in each treatment were increased to 231,
the project would be powered to have an 80% chance of detecting a change in the
predicted probability of 0.1 using a one tailed test with α=0.05. If a significant
relationship between the given threat of preemption and support for the described
service proposal exists at all, the effect is very likely smaller than that ten-point
difference, as this investigation showed a maximum difference of 0.057.

Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

While the survey responses showed that city leaders are generally unswayed
by threatened state actions, there are some heterogeneous treatment effects. These
effects are likely the result of the construction of the vignettes. In describing the
threatened state action, the treatment vignettes state that “some state legislators
do not think such a plan is within the proper role of city government” (see
appendix). This phrasing may activate certain perceptions and attitudes in
moderate and conservative city leaders and lead them to be more sensitive to the
treatments than they would otherwise be.
Table 9: Difference of Proportions for Liberals
Officials who Identified as Liberal
Diff.
Std. Error
p
p1 – p 2
Control vs.
Moderate
Threat

n

-0.054

0.038

0.924

117

Control Vs.
High
Threat

-0.016

0.043

0.649

131

Moderate
Threat vs.
High
Threat

0.037

0.031

0.128

134

Diff. is the difference of proportions, with standard errors beside it. p represents the one-tailed
p value. The one-tailed test increases the chance of finding a significant relationship between
the treatment and responses, but such a relationship is still found to not be significant.

Table 10: Difference of Proportions for Moderates and Conservatives

Control
vs.
Moderate
Threat
Control
Vs. High
Threat
Moderate
Threat vs.
High
Threat

Officials who Identified as
“Middle of the Road”
Diff.
Std.
p
n
p1 – p 2
Error

Officials who Identified as
Conservative
Diff.
Std.
p
n
p1 – p 2
Error

0.051

0.076

0.245

88

0.046

0.061

0.225

209

0.129

0.078

0.048

97

0.118

0.067

0.038

188

0.078

0.089

0.196

81

0.072

0.069

0.147

185

Diff. is the difference of proportions, with standard errors beside it. p represents the one-tailed
p value. The one-tailed test was used as it increases the chance of finding a significant
relationship between the treatment and responses. In this instance, both groups show a
significant relationship between the high threat treatment and associated responses when
compared to the control group, but no other comparison produced this result.

Table nine shows the results of the difference of proportions test for
respondents who self-identified as liberals. Liberals were resistant to the treatment
effects, and it appears that a perceived threat of state preemption in this instance
had essentially zero effect on their voting decisions. Table 10 displays the results of
a difference of proportions test for respondents that self-identified as conservatives
and moderates (identified as “middle of the road” in the survey prompt). The
results of this test show that the high threat treatment swayed the responses of
moderates and conservatives by about 12-13 points, and the results are significant

in a one tailed test with α=0.05. Substantively, however, these results are less
remarkable. For conservatives, the effect dropped support for the proposal from
76.4% of respondents to 64.6%, and for moderates, support for the proposal
dropped from 88.4% to 75.5%. In each case, the proposal would have passed easily.
An effect of this size is far less detrimental to this proposal than it might be if the
proposal was controversial at the local level or had only borderline support from a
city council.

Discussion
From the results of this survey, it is clear that the treatments used did not
have a noteworthy effect on the how city leaders indicated that they would vote,
and it appears that a threat of preemption alone is not sufficient to alter the votes
of city leaders. Even in the narrow circumstances where the treatment had a
statistically significant effect on support for the proposal, that effect was not
substantively significant, and would only scuttle proposals with borderline
support.
There are a few explanations for why this might be the case. First, it is not
necessarily in the interest of city leaders to be swayed by the state legislature, as
state legislatures do not vote for city leaders. From a normative perspective, this is
reassuring, as it would lead us to believe that electoral incentives are at play in the
decision making of local officials and that those officials strive to represent the
interests of their communities. The interests of other communities in the state,
and of the representatives in the state legislature are not the concern of local
officials, except as those independent concerns intersect. This is an intuitive, but
important conclusion for explaining the voting incentives at play in this
experiment. This explanation also provides a way to view the results as fitting
within the broader literature on representation and responsiveness, as outlined by
Tiebout, Warshaw, Tausanovitch, Hirschman and others.

Second, city leaders may not be afraid of preemption itself, and may wish to
react only after the state legislature has acted. Even if some city leaders do not
think the proposal is good policy, they may determine that it is more important for
them to act according to their constituent’s desires than it is to save time and
money for the city government. In this scenario, city leaders can blame a state
legislature for the restrictions and consequences of preemption, and reduce their
own electoral risk as a result. Weaver notes that the motivation behind blameavoidance is simple, as city leaders “cannot pursue their other policy objectives if
they are not re-elected, and they will not be re-elected if they do not suppress their
own views of “good policy” when those views clash with the strongly held opinions
of their constituents” (Weaver 2009). Although the survey vignettes did not
describe a desire for a municipal broadband network as a strongly held opinion for
voters in the city, the vignettes did indicate majority support, and the incentives
involved in blame-avoidance may be at play here.
Finally, the survey itself may have presented a case where a threat of
preemption was less intimidating than it needed to be to inspire a change in vote
patterns. The way that questions are framed can alter how individuals perceive
their choices, and it is possible that a more stark threat of preemption could have
had a greater discouraging effect on the proportion of respondents that indicated
support for the proposal. This effect may be seen in the responses of conservative
and moderate respondents that received the high threat treatment, but that effect

was limited and was not significant across the general sample. While the effect
that question framing has is important, I do not believe that the failure of the
treatments to produce significant results can be traced to the framing of the
preemption threat, as one of the treatments was specifically designed to describe a
high threat of preemption from the state. It is also important that the scenarios
described appear to be somewhat realistic to the respondent, and increasing the
given threat to a point where it inspired significant results might require
describing a situation that currently serving city officials would simply find
unrealistic. Alternatively, an overstated threat of preemption might not be
something that respondents perceive as a realistic threat for their cities. It is not
entirely uncommon for state legislators to introduce legislation that is unlikely to
pass, and city leaders may be willing to call the bluff of their state representatives.

Concluding Remarks
In some ways, the subject of municipal broadband offers a fairly narrow
perspective on city services, and perceptions of the issue may occasionally be
colored by outside variables that are difficult to measure. However, municipal
broadband also provides a useful and distinctive lens through which to examine
some of the relationship dynamics of intra-state federalism. Although the state is
clearly superior in law and capacity, city leaders have few electoral incentives and
little reason to do what state leaders might hope. Conflicts between cities and
states are not new and do not appear to be going away.
It seems logical that states will act to influence and manipulate cities into
avoiding undesirable policy positions, but we are left without evidence that
manipulation in the form of a threat will be effective. Of course, states can still
exercise preemptive authority over cities as a blunt instrument of policy, and many
state legislatures will likely be willing to exercise this authority. At times, this may
be a drastic step, and for a state legislature looking to avoid a showdown, there
does not appear to be a middle-ground solution.
The independent electoral incentives of city and state leaders may doom
them to conflict in certain cases, but in other situations, these separate incentives
may allow city and state leaders to satisfy their own constituencies more
effectively, allowing for a diversity of local political outcomes. Residents of such

states may be better able to vote with their feet without moving out of state
altogether or drastically uprooting their lives, and potential new residents may
have an easier time finding a community to settle in. Whether these
considerations would be compelling to leaders at the state level is unclear, but
such a question would be a good place for future research into the dynamics of
intra-state federalism.
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APPENDIX – SURVEY CONTENT AND DISTRIBUTION STATISTICS

Survey Content

For full transparency, the complete wording of the questions used for this
project’s survey experiment are presented here. The survey posed some additional
questions for respondents beyond what was briefly described in the methodology
section. First, respondents were asked to indicate their political ideology on a
seven-point left-right ideological scale. Additionally, respondents were asked
about how they viewed their role as a legislator, with the aim of classifying
respondents as delegates or trustees. Variable names are indicated with each
question. The full content of the survey follows.
Variable Name: Elected Status
Question: Have you served as an elected municipal official?
Response Options:
1. I am currently serving as an elected municipal official.
2. I have formerly served as an elected municipal official.
3. I have never served as an elected municipal official.

Introductory Statement: Please consider the following scenario and questions as if
they applied to your city and you have a vote on the council.
Variable Name: Control
Prompt and Question:

Among the new policy proposals within your community is a plan for the city’s
utility department to create a fiber-optic internet network. This network would
offer broadband internet access as an additional utility to customers that choose to
participate. It appears that the proposal is supported by about 55% to 60% of the
population, and is not likely to present you with great political risk.
It appears that the plan is financially reasonable; furthermore, the principal
financing for the project should be manageable. In addition, the proposal has been
designed to minimize the financial costs of network creation by spreading the
project over years and implementing the new infrastructure as existing electric and
other utility lines are maintained. Fiber-optic cable will be used alongside current
utility infrastructure and will be put in place whenever any other form of work
needs to be done within the grid. With the decision to minimize the instances in
which underground lines need to be accessed, it is likely that costs will remain
modest.
Based on this information, would you say that you support or oppose the current
proposal?
Response Options:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Strongly support
Somewhat support
Somewhat oppose
Strongly oppose

Variable Name: Moderate Threat

Prompt and Question:
Among the new policy proposals within your community is a plan for the city’s
utility department to create a fiber-optic internet network. This network would
offer broadband internet access as an additional utility to customers that choose to
participate. It appears that the proposal is supported by about 60% of the
population, and is not likely to present you with great political risk.
It appears that the plan is financially reasonable; furthermore, the principal
financing for the project should be manageable. In addition, the proposal has been
designed to minimize the financial costs of network creation by spreading the
project over years and implementing the new infrastructure as existing electric and
other utility lines are maintained. Fiber-optic cable will be used alongside current
utility infrastructure and will be put in place whenever any other form of work
needs to be done within the grid. With the decision to minimize the instances in
which underground lines need to be accessed, it is likely that costs will remain
modest.
There is a possibility that the state government may interfere with such a plan.
You have heard rumors that some state legislators do not think such a plan is
within the proper role of city government and may introduce legislation that
would limit your city’s ability to create and run a network such as this. If such

legislation were to pass, it could undo some or all of the work your city does on
this issue.
Based on this information, do you support the current proposal?
Response Options:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Strongly support
Somewhat support
Somewhat oppose
Strongly oppose

Variable Name: High Threat
Prompt and Question:
Among the new policy proposals within your community is a plan for the city’s
utility department to create a fiber-optic internet network. This network would
offer broadband internet access as an additional utility to customers that choose to
participate. It appears that the proposal is supported by about 60% of the
population, and is not likely to present you with great political risk.
It appears that the plan is financially reasonable; furthermore, the principal
financing for the project should be manageable. In addition, the proposal has been
designed to minimize the financial costs of network creation by spreading the
project over years and implementing the new infrastructure as existing electric and
other utility lines are maintained. Fiber-optic cable will be used alongside current
utility infrastructure and will be put in place whenever any other form of work

needs to be done within the grid. With the decision to minimize the instances in
which underground lines need to be accessed, it is likely that costs will remain
modest.
There is a possibility that the state government may interfere with such a plan.
You have heard rumors that some state legislators do not think such a plan is
within the proper role of city government and may introduce legislation that
would limit your city’s ability to create and run a network such as this. Major
lobbying groups and corporations, including the American Legislative Exchange
Council and the major telephone, cable, and communications companies of your
state appear to support the legislature’s desire to block cities from running their
own broadband internet services. If legislation like this were to pass, it could undo
some or all of the work your city does on this issue.
Based on this information, do you support the current proposal?
Response Options:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Strongly support
Somewhat support
Somewhat oppose
Strongly oppose

Variable Name: Act Quickly
Presented to respondents in either of the treatment groups:

Question: If you do support, would you attempt to act quickly before the state
legislature can take action?
Response Options:
1. Yes
2. No

Variable Name: Representation Style:
Question: Do you consider your role as a city leader to provide effective leadership
based on your experience, judgment, and capability? Or, do you consider your
primary role as a city leader to represent the will of the residents of your city
independent of your own personal judgment?
1. Leadership based on judgment
2. Leadership based on representation

Variable Name: Ideology
Question: Do you consider yourself to be:
Response Options:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Very Liberal
Liberal
Somewhat Liberal
Middle of the Road
Somewhat Conservative
Conservative
Very Conservative

Geographic Distribution of Responses

The geographic distribution of individual survey responses has also been
included here. The following tables describe the frequency of responses from each
state and what proportion of responses they represent, as well as the frequency of
mailing addresses from each state and the proportion of the mailing list they each
state’s list represents.
Table 11: Survey Responses by State
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana

Frequency Percentage
7
1.05
4
1.66
15
2.26
9
1.36
52
7.83
23
3.46
11
1.66
4
0.60
22
3.31
9
1.36
10
1.51
42
6.33
9
1.36
10
1.51
7
1.05
3
0.45
1
0.15
7
1.05
10
1.51
15
2.26
34
5.12
33
4.97
2
0.30
9
1.36
1
0.15

Table Continues
Nebraska
2
Nevada
1
New Hampshire
4
New Jersey
19
New Mexico
4
New York
37
North Carolina
16
North Dakota
1
Ohio
21
Oklahoma
6
Oregon
18
Pennsylvania
22
Rhode Island
2
South Carolina
7
South Dakota
4
Tennessee
9
Texas
28
Utah
28
Vermont
8
Virginia
14
Washington
22
West Virginia
6
Wisconsin
32
Wyoming
4

0.30
0.15
0.60
2.86
0.60
5.57
2.41
0.15
3.16
0.90
2.71
3.31
0.30
1.05
0.60
1.36
4.22
4.22
1.20
2.11
3.31
0.90
4.82
0.60

Table 12: Survey Mailing Distribution by State
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida

Frequency Percentage
552
1.55
135
0.38
506
1.42
453
1.27
2483
6.97
821
2.31
686
1.93
133
0.37
10
0.03
1344

3.77

Table Continues
Georgia
838
Hawaii
11
Idaho
191
Illinois
2253
Indiana
752
Iowa
597
Kansas
405
Kentucky
495
Louisiana
222
Maine
441
Maryland
319
Massachusetts
962
Michigan
1673
Minnesota
1349
Mississippi
264
Missouri
977
Montana
91
Nebraska
183
Nevada
49
New Hampshire
270
New Jersey
1649
New Mexico
251
New York
1991
North Carolina
1032
North Dakota
115
Ohio
1737
Oklahoma
300
Oregon
587
Pennsylvania
1395
Rhode Island
196
South Carolina
387
South Dakota
129
Tennessee
535
Texas
1933
Utah
436
Vermont
208
Virginia
483
Washington
784
West Virginia
200
Wisconsin
1672
Wyoming
120

2.35
0.03
0.54
6.33
2.11
1.68
1.14
1.39
0.62
1.24
0.90
2.70
4.70
3.79
0.74
2.74
0.26
0.51
0.14
0.76
4.63
0.70
5.59
2.90
0.32
4.88
0.84
1.65
3.92
0.55
1.09
0.36
1.50
5.43
1.22
0.25
1.36
2.20
0.56
4.70
0.34

